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From Internal and External Perspectives
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Abstract
This paper describes the authors’ almost 30-year (1972–1998) personal
experience with the World Bank (WB) education sector operations from the
internal perspective. Then, it discusses the authors’ 20-year (1999–2020) observation from an external perspective. The paper aims to reveal the goals,
objectives, strategies, the mechanism, and processes of decision-making,
especially on how an education loan and credit is justified, of the world’s
largest international aid organization for the education sector in developing
countries (some $4 billion a year). Through this effort, the author provides
a sound basis for insiders’ and outsiders’ fair assessments or criticisms of WB
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education sector operations. It also allows for some lessons/suggestions for
the future WB education sector operations and for possible participations,
collaborations, and cooperation with outsiders interested in WB operations
in the education sector.
Key words: World Bank, Education Sector, Personal Experience, Lessons Learned
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes one of the authors’ almost 30-year (1972–1998) personal
experience with the World Bank (WB) education sector operations from the
internal perspective, followed by authors’ 20-year (1999–2020) observation of
them from an external perspective. The paper aims to reveal the goals, objectives,
strategies, the mechanism and processes of decision-makings, especially how an
education loan and credit is justified, of the world largest international aid
organization for the education sector in developing countries (some $4 billion
a year). Through this effort, the authors try to provide a sound basis for
insiders’ and outsiders’ fair assessments or criticisms of WB education sector
operations and draw some lessons/suggestions for the future WB education
sector operations and for possible participations, collaborations and cooperation
of outsiders interested in WB operations in the education sector.

Ⅱ. FROM INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE- 1960s – 1990s
The most challenging task I had ever experienced with the WB education
sector was how to justify the projects that I had to assess as a member of the
WB appraisal teams. Of course, I had to follow Bank education sector operations
policy. However, a written Bank education sector policy was often unavailable
for quite some time (the first official policy was published in 1974) or not
updated in a timely fashion. Other times, it was available, but too general and
lacked guidance for a specific country and time (Pacharopoulos, 2006; <Table 1>).
Before I joined the WB, I had assumed Bank education sector operations would
be dictated by the philosophy or theory of the education sector. Therefore, as
an economist, I felt uneasy and anxious when I joined the Bank’s education
sector operations in September 1972. However, no education sector policy
existed then in the Bank. My experience shows that de facto Bank education
sector operational strategy was dictated to a great extent by the Bank-wide
operations strategy on the one hand, and the prevailing development economics
theory on the other. The formal Bank education sector policies or strategies did
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<Table 1> History of education sector operational policies of the World Bank
Year

Document

1945

Bank operations start

1963

First Education loan

1967

Prof. Blaug’s White Paper

1970

President’s second memo on
education policy

1972

Education Sector Policy Statement

1974

Education Sector Working Paper

1990

Primary education policy paper

1991

VOCED policy paper

1999

Education sector strategy

Remarks

Recommends the rate of return approach to
justify Bank education lending projects

Includes Bank education sector lending
policy and programs

Source: Pasacharopoulos G. (2006); World Bank (1974).

not provide much guidance on the appraisal or justification of the project
proposed by the government. Incidentally, the Bank-wide operational strategy
and the development economics theory evolved over time about every decade.
Therefore, my experience with the Bank education sector operations was a
history of the evolution of Bank-wide operational strategy and development
economics theory.
In my opinion, the education sector operations made decent contributions to
the achievement of the development goals and objectives of the WB since the
1960s through expansion of educational opportunities for school-age children
and youth, and improvement of academic achievements of students (Heyneman
& Lee, 2016). During the next 15 to 20 years, the Bank-wide operational strategy
will again have to be adjusted to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), and accordingly, education sector operational strategies will have to be
updated as well.

1. During the 1960s: Economic Growth
When I met the supervisor of my new job in September 1972, I was told that
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after five days (including the Labor Day holiday), I was scheduled for a business
trip to a country in Central America for about four weeks, together with a team
of 5 professionals. The Bank called it an appraisal mission to assess an education
project proposed by the government for Bank financing. My supervisor emphasized that this mission was the most critical stage of a project cycle since
it would have to justify the proposed loan to the Board of Directors, and it
would be the final step of the technical justification process. I was given a
pamphlet on the project cycle, a reference document on the educational development history in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and a sample
appraisal report of the past operation. However, there was no education sector
policy or strategy paper. Instead, I was told that another education economist,
who had joined the Bank a year ahead of me after several years’ experience at
the Asian Development Bank, would travel with me to provide field guidance
and assistance for the first five days.
Upon arrival in the country, my tutor and I had to work with an interpreter
provided by the Ministry of Education (MOE) since three out of the six mission
members totally lacked Spanish proficiency. Such mission composition in terms
of language proficiency was apparently standard for the Bank at that time since
the Education Sector Department (ESD) of the Bank was centralized and
organizationally separated from the decentralized Country Program Department
of the Regional Vice-Presidencies. The rationale for the ESD’s centralized
organization like all other sector departments was cross-fertilization of better
sector policies and practices among regions. Since sector staff members were
supposed to work across the regions, they did not have in-depth knowledge
about specific countries. Therefore, I appreciated that my tutor made an arrangement for a briefing on the country by the Program Department’s country
economist and loan officer before our departure for the country. They also
provided us the latest country economic report, which proved extremely useful
for my mission task.
The project proposed by the government had two components. One was to
expand and improve the general secondary education program, and the other
one was to expand and strengthen the National Apprenticeship Institute, which
had been established just a couple of years before and managed institutionalized
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non-formal vocational and technical training programs across the country. The
mission’s main task was to justify the two project components from economic
and social points of view and ensure the technical aspects of the two components were sound. I realized that my main mission role was to assess the link
and consistency between the national economic and social development strategy
and the proposed project.
Technically speaking, it was not onerous, since I had been in charge of
analyzing the vocational and technical manpower requirements for the Second
Five-Year Economic Development Plan of Korea (1967–71) when I was working
at the middle management level for the Korean government. I asked MOE for
an analysis of the national vocational/technical manpower requirements by
industry, occupation, level of education and year of working experience. The
MOE’s response was that it had done such an analysis a few years ago, and that
it would need to be updated by the end of our mission’s stay in the country. In
the meantime, I started collecting necessary data and parameters for such an
analysis. However, I could not get the updated analysis from MOE until the final
day of the mission, and MOE finally promised to send it to the WB in Washington,
DC, by express mail the next week; it was actually never received by me despite
several phone calls I placed. It was a cultural shock to me.
As soon as we came back from the Central American mission, I was assigned
to the ESD of the East Africa Regional Vice-Presidency. I wrote my portion of
the appraisal report and submitted it to the mission leader in the ESD of Latin
America and the Caribbean Regional Vice-Presidency. While we were on mission,
the Bank underwent a drastic organizational change under the direction of the
President, Robert McNamara. He decentralized all sector departments to each of
the six regional vice presidencies, so that country and sector departments could
work more closely under a single vice president. Sector department professionals
were meant to become more specialized in one region, so they could respond
to regional demands more quickly and appropriately.
Upon returning to the Bank headquarters, I had to prepare the analysis of
manpower requirements by myself without consulting with the borrowing
country government officials. However, my analysis and write-up must have
struck my supervisors well since, instead of the mission leader, I was asked to
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be responsible for preparing the whole appraisal report based on the contributions from the mission members, and later for presenting the project to the
Board of Directors for approval. Therefore, two weeks after I was assigned to
the East Africa Regional Vice-Presidency, I was called back to the Latin America
Regional Vice-Presidency. Other colleagues envied my situation since most new
staff members were able to lead a mission only after some years of Bank
experience. However, I had to sweat a lot to learn the Bank report writing skills
in a leap frog way.
Before I joined the Bank in 1972, the Bank-wide operational objective had
been economic development, especially economic growth, of member countries,
and the main means for the Bank to achieve such a goal was lending operations
for the infrastructure sectors. I thought the theoretical basis for the Banks’s
disproportionally heavy infrastructure lending at that time was Harrod-Domar
Growth Theory (Domar, 1946; Harrod, 1939), which stated that economic growth
was attainable exclusively through investment in and accumulation of physical
capital. In the 1960s, therefore, the education sector in the WB was at an
embryonic stage, and tried to prove its ability to contribute to the Bank-wide
objective of economic development, in particular economic growth. Therefore,
with the assistance of UNESCO’s technical cooperation team, the education
sector selected for its initial lending operations institutionalized, non-formal
vocational training projects and general secondary education, especially in Latin
America, and engineering and technical higher education projects in Asia. Such
operations were justified by the manpower requirements for economic growth
and was also supported by the inventive theory of human capital contributions
to economic growth, as outlined by Becker (1964) and Schultz (1961). The theory
and practices of the education sector operations did not have much gaps at all
in terms of their rationale and justification.
However, I felt that there was doubt in the Bank on whether education sector
operations had a proper role, since the Bank’s main objective was economic
growth of member countries exclusively by physical capital investment. The
education sector operations were therefore regarded as extraneous. To allay
such doubts, a cautiously formulated strategy of the education sector operations
was to emphasize building construction and equipment and furniture provision
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for vocational and engineering education and training (what was called hardware inputs), as well as transform general secondary education to more practical
secondary education programs. I thought this strategy was consistent not only
with the Bank-wide operational objective and strategy, but also with the theory
of human capital contributions to economic growth. UN agencies’ operations
in the education sector were limited to technical assistance and social relief
operations, and therefore, Bank lending operations in the education sector did
not pose any threat or competition.

2. During the 1970s: Steady Goal, Strategic Shift to Poverty
Alleviation
The Bank-wide operational goal of economic growth of developing countries
was maintained in the 1970s as in the 1960s; however, the means for achieving
it was radically changing by emphasizing poverty eradication, especially in the
rural and farming sectors. McNamara’s address at the World Bank-IMF Annual
Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya (1973) eloquently laid out the strategy and its rationale.
It gave me a strong impression that the development economics was sharply
shifting its emphasis from growth theory to welfare economics theory. The
theory of the second best by Lipsey & Lancaster (1956) seemed to support the
Bank’s strategic shift. Despite the large amount of aid in the earlier decades, the
market failures in the infrastructure-industrial-urban sectors did not improve
people’s living standards in aid-recipient countries; rather, poverty in the ruralagricultural sectors persisted or got worse. Therefore, governments would
intervene contrary to usual policy and invest in the rural and agricultural sectors
directly to attack poverty.
The Bank quickly expanded agricultural sector operations, transforming them
to integrated development operations covering agricultural production, extension,
livestock, and irrigation components, and to rural and regional development
operations including roads, water, education, population, health, tourism, and
small-scale manufacturing sectors. The Central Projects Vice-Presidency monitored each regional lending operation’s contributions to poverty alleviation by
measuring the proportion of the poor among the project’s targeted beneficiaries.
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Although these integrated agricultural and regional development projects
contributed to the rapid expansion of WB lending amounts, the pace of the rural
poverty reduction was not so rapid during McNamara era. Therefore, the WB
received a fair amount of criticism, especially by the USA Congress during IDA
replenishment approval period. A lot of Bank staff thought that the “integrated
planning” was a good idea, but the “integrated or coordinated execution” was not
realistic and feasible in developing countries. If they can do it well, they would
be no longer developing countries.
The education sector operations also spread their scope to other levels of
education, especially non-formal education for adults or farmers and basic
education in rural areas. They did not need to be justified by the manpower
requirements for economic growth. As long as the target groups of the education
sector operations were poor, especially in rural areas, free-standing education
sector operations and the education and training components of regional
development and integrated agricultural development operations, could be
justified based on the poverty alleviation and the theory of human capital
contributions to growth. The education sector was no longer extraneous; from
the marginal areas it slowly approached toward the center of Bank operations
based on the human capital theory and its contributions to poverty alleviation.
In the 1970s, the size of the education sector lending almost doubled in every
five years. It would have been difficult for the education sector to expand its
lending operations by formulating an education sector strategy based mainly on
education sector philosophy or theory. The sheer expansion of the education
sector lending was a part of the much larger trend of overall Bank-wide lending operations, which increased about 400% in the 1970s under McNamara’s
presidency.
In addition, other sectors, like agriculture, water supply, and transport, sought
education sector advice and assistance for preparation and appraisal of their
project-related training. As a result, the Sector Department Director of the LAC
Region appointed me as an informal coordinator of project-related training
programs in addition to my formal title of Deputy Division Chief of the
Education Sector. This informal title provided me an excellent opportunity to
learn how the other sectors in the Bank operated. I had felt Bank careers were
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too narrowly specialized by sector and rarely provided an opportunity to gain
experience across sectors. This experience with projects-related training provided
a good springboard to get promoted when the Central Projects Vice- Presidency
announced an opening for the projects policy adviser’s position, which directly
supports the Vice President’s function as one of the three Bank-wide Loan
Committee members. This Committee was to review and approve project loan
proposals of all sectors of each Regional Vice-Presidency before they could start
loan negotiations with the borrowing country’s delegation.
In the 1970s, there was another transformation in the Bank, this time in the
education sector operations. Almost all Latin American countries were incited by
the Bank to transform theoretical secondary schools into practical secondary
schools, so that students were to be exposed to industrial, business, and home
management technical skills education and training in addition to the traditional
general curricula. The comprehensive secondary school concept was apparently
influenced by the multilateral secondary school concept, which was fashionable
in the United Kingdom under the Labour Party’s education policy. The policy
concept was matching the Bank’s de facto education policy of satisfying the
manpower requirements of the industrial development policies of many developing
countries at that time. Many countries in Latin America took advantage of this
Bank education policy to expand secondary education opportunities at high cost.
These schools were all constructed with industrial workshops and laboratories
filled with costly equipment, furniture and educational materials for the initial
few years. However, a large portion of the graduates continued with higher
education, and some graduates who entered the labor market did not satisfy
employers’ expectations in terms of skill levels.
In addition, negative evaluation and research results of vocational/technical
education and training programs reinforced inside and outside criticisms of the
Bank’s education and training policy, which was based on manpower requirements. The factors responsible for such disappointments were numerous. Most
important in my opinion were much slower economic growth rates than those
assumed for the manpower requirement analysis, due especially to the two oil
crises in the 1970s; insufficient teaching/training materials; and insufficient education/training programs for the practical subject teachers who used the work-
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shops and laboratories; as well as socio-economic prejudices toward vocationaltechnical track graduates entering the labor market instead of proceeding to
higher educational institutions.
Therefore, in the late 1970s, some innovative staff members tried to apply
economic cost-benefit analysis to justify appraised projects, although, unlike all
other sectors of the WB, the education sector was formally waived for carrying out
such analysis. One project, praised by the Board for taking such an approach,
treated the sum of annual school building rental costs saved as project benefits
and the construction costs of new secondary schools as project costs, thereby
computing a rate of return and cost-benefit ratio. However, I felt that the
appraisal team was misusing the cost-benefit framework. The benefit and cost
should be defined from the project objective. For such an education project
which aimed to improve the quality of learning, a cost-effectiveness analysis
should have been adopted by treating students’ enhanced academic achievements
in the new school buildings as project benefits, and the construction and operating
costs of the new school buildings as costs, and this ratio should have been
compared with the ratio between the academic achievements and rental and
operational costs of current school buildings. As such, a cost-effective analysis
instead of a rate of return or cost-benefit ratio analysis would have been more
appropriate framework as an economic analysis of the project.

3. During the 1980s: Debt Resolution
In the 1980s, the Bank’s mandate for poverty alleviation had to be interrupted.
The world’s economies, especially in Latin America, were in deep recession due
mainly to the 1980s debt crises. The actual growth rate over the 1980s was
negative; hence a lost decade. With a realistic projection of negative growth
rates, the manpower requirement approach to justifying education/training
projects did not have much room to maneuver. Development Economics such as
human capital or welfare theory also lacked room to play. From that point,
neo-classical economics dictated the Bank’s country assistance strategies. The
debt crises were caused by excessive borrowing by the government and
state-owned enterprises during and after the oil crises in the 1970s, the easy
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access to international financing sources, as well as the sudden and sharp
increases in interest rates to arrest galloping inflation. The public sector was
forced to adopt retrenchment and liberalize economies, including trade, finance,
housing, and labor markets.
The size of Bank lending for the education sector did not increase much and
stagnated during the 1980s. This was not the result of the Bank’s active education
sector policy; the education sector was forced by the Bank-wide lending operational strategy. In the 1970s, under McNamara’s presidency, the Bank lending
level increased by some 400%, but in the 1980s, it rose only by 10%. Bank
lending emphasized fiscal sector retrenchment and economic structural reform
in its member countries. The Bank and IMF did not select a specific sector for
reducing public expenditures, but many developing countries selected social
sectors to comply with retrenchment prerequisites for structural adjustment
loans, and the education sector bore the brunt of the cuts. Within the education
sector, for political convenience, basic education took the shock most severely
in Latin America. By this time, Bank education sector policy encouraged member
countries to prioritize basic education investment, since research outside the
Bank showed that the rate of return for primary education was higher than
that for secondary and higher education (Psacharopoulos, 1985). However, the
negative effects of the structural reform program on the social sectors,
particularly education, were so severe that other international aid agencies,
particularly UNICEF, criticized the Bank-wide lending strategy as “structural
reform without human face.” The Bank education sector maintained the traditional fields of lending: general secondary education and basic education,
diminishing technical education, but adding higher education, despite its advice
for its member countries against this level of education in terms of investment
priority.

4. During the 1990s: Poverty Reduction Again and Growth Recovery
In 1987, with the appointment of the new president, Barber Conable, the WB
went into another reorganization, which reinforced the decentralization and
regionalization of the earlier reorganization in 1972. The essence of this
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reorganization was, first, dividing the country program department of each
Regional Vice-Presidency to deepen the relations with client countries. Each
country program department would be responsible for a group of countries in
the same Regional Vice-Presidency, and the sector department of the Regional
Vice-Presidency, which was already regionalized in 1972, would be divided and
downgraded to belong to each of the several country programs departments.
Second, the Regional Vice-Presidency would become more autonomous in
approving loans/credits; in addition, a new technical department would advise
and monitor the operational quality of the sector divisions of various country
program departments based on its own research and policy work. Therefore,
this reorganization implied proliferation of a large number of positions for
technical specialists and middle-level managers. With this reorganization, I was
transferred from the Central Projects Vice-Presidency to the Mexico and Central
America Country Department, which also covered Venezuela later, as a Projects
Policy Adviser.
In the early 1990s, all Bank staff members were called to a meeting to be
briefed by senior officials on another reorganization. The main message was
that the Bank would create another Regional Vice-Presidency called Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, and a lot of resources would be channeled from the
existing Regional Vice-Presidencies to this new one. In 1989, the East German
government collapsed, and in 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved, and its
satellite countries all became independent. The Cold War, which was one of the
main causes of the birth of the WB and IMF, ended, and the Bank gained the
chance to help transform the former planned economies to market-oriented
ones, assist in creating new political and economic systems and institutions,
alleviate poverty in developing countries, and help their economies recover
from the recession of the 1980s. I felt that these new Bank mandates were based
on the theories of institutional economics, welfare economics, and human
capital economics.
To implement these new mandates, the education sector renewed its effort to
promote vocational-technical education for economic growth, which had been
somewhat neglected during the previous decade, and basic education for
poverty alleviation. The Bank education sector published policy papers on voca-
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tional-technical education and basic education (World Bank, 1990, 1991, respectively). The vocational-technical education policy paper preferred not diversified
or comprehensive secondary education programs, but separate and specialized
vocational and technical secondary schools or programs. The basic education
sector policy emphasized a higher rate of return to basic education than
secondary and higher education, but did not impose an exclusive investment in
basic education before investment in secondary or higher education.

1) Application of the mandates in Mexico
However, since the 1987 reorganization, human development lending operations
in our department were in trouble. In the first place, our Mexico and Central
America country department was the only country department out of some 30
in the Bank that lacked a human development sector division. The human
development sector was to be responsible for education, health and population,
and social protection subsectors.
The main reason for this absence was that the government of Mexico did not
want to borrow from abroad for the human development, in particular education,
sector. Mexico’s constitution allows borrowing from abroad only for “productive
sectors,” and the government officials argued that the human development sector
had not been defined as productive for a long time. This clause was apparently
based on Mexico’s history of repeated foreign debt defaults and invasions by
foreign military forces. Because of Mexico’s position, our department could not
meet the demand for Bank lending for countries in Central America that saw
human development investment as productive. The absence of human development
sector operations was a great disadvantage for poverty-oriented lending operations. With the support of the Vice-President, therefore, our department rushed
to create a human development sector division at the beginning of the 1990s.
Because of my past experience with human development sector management, I
was asked to create and head it.
Since the human development sector division was created in the middle of a
fiscal year, the budget provided was small compared with those for other sector
divisions. Moreover, the division budget composition was a great disadvantage,
allocating most funds for hiring consultants; only some 30% of the total budget
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was from a regular source. This was exactly the reverse ratio of other sector
divisions’ budgets. Therefore, with only a few regular (permanent) staff members,
we had to play the main role for meeting the new poverty-oriented lending
mandate. Fortunately, I was able to assemble a small number of energetic,
dedicated, and talented staff members in a relatively short time.
Moreover, we were able to use our budgetary disadvantage as a positive tool.
At the time, to support the new Bank mandates, several advanced countries
began to contribute their financial resources as trust funds to the WB, and most
were exclusively earmarked for project-preparation purposes. Among these trust
funds, the PHRD Fund donated by the government of Japan was the largest
(about $1 billion) and prioritized human development sector operations. Therefore,
as soon as we identified project proposals from our client countries, our staff
started preparing trust fund applications to make up for our small regular budget.
Even after our budget composition issue was redressed and endowed with a
similar ratio as other sector divisions in the following year, our staff continued
preparing trust fund applications competitively, partly because they were
motivated by my delegating them the execution of the approved trust funds.
About three or four years later, the size of our sector division budget was the
largest in our department, and the number of staff members and size of lending
operations were the largest among Bank-wide education sector divisions.
A unique exception to the Mexico government’s policy for non-borrowing
from the Bank was the vocational-technical education and training programs,
since they provided the skilled and technical manpower needed by the directly
productive sectors for national economic growth. At the request of the Mexican
government, the Bank has financed a technical secondary education program
since the late 1970s. A group of reform-minded senators in Mexico pushed the
government to launch vocational-technical secondary education in earlier years.
Industrializing Mexico desperately demanded vocational-technical skills, but the
vocational-technical secondary education program was so dysfunctional and of
poor quality that it did not meet industrial and youth demands. Because the
strong teachers union adamantly opposed any reform, the government created
a semi-autonomous organization called CONALEP (National College of Professional Technical Education). This college tried to establish and operate a
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national network of technical secondary schools with only contracted instructors
seconded by nearby private and public enterprises, so instructors could not
organize a school-based trade union.
With the Bank’s three-time repeat financing, these schools were operating
exceedingly well. Most graduates were employed immediately at relatively high
wage rates, as expected at appraisal. However, these positive results were confirmed only by Bank supervision visits to enterprises and CONALEP’s superficial
opinion surveys of graduates and employers, but never by rigorous and scientific
tracer studies of the graduates, which was a covenant of the Bank loan agreement.
CONALEP did not feel it was necessary since they could confirm the graduates’
placement situation by visits and feedback from graduates and employers. The
previous Bank officer and manager in charge of the project’s supervision
accepted those opinion surveys as complying with the special covenant.
As our department was about to negotiate for the proposed fourth and final
lending operation for the improvement and expansion of CONALEP in 1991, our
technical department advisers criticized the lack of rigorous and scientific tracer
studies. They advised that the negotiation should be delayed until such studies
were completed and reviewed by the Bank.
However, delayed project negotiations of this first operation of the new sector
division would create serious troubles for meeting Departmental operational
targets and the reputation of this newly created sector division. As a new
manager of the sector division, I offered a compromise. The loan agreement for
the new and final operation would include the same covenant again, and a
rigorous and scientific tracer study would be completed to our satisfaction. The
compromise was agreed on, and we were able to meet the operational targets.
However, during the next four years we had a hard time persuading CONALEP
to carry out such rigorous tracer studies. Once I jokingly suggested to the
Director General of CONALEP that if they completed rigorous tracer studies, I
would use the data to contribute an article to a world renowned education
sector journal to publicize CONALEP’s performance and achievements. In the
end, CONALEP completed a two-year tracer studies, and as promised, I wrote
a paper on the evolution of vocational and technical secondary education in
Mexico that was published in an education sector journal (Lee, 1998).
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A few years later, I retired from the Bank and repatriated to my home country
to teach at a graduate school. One day, I received an international mail in a
mutilated envelope, which had been sent to the WB in the USA and then
forwarded to Seoul, Korea. It was from the former CONALEP Director-General,
who thanked me personally for the article, and then said that thanks to it, he
got a promotion to the presidency of one of the most prestigious universities in
Mexico, from which the incumbent president of Mexico graduated.
This MOE technical training project loan was followed by two more vocational-technical training project loans for the Ministry of Labor’s (MOL’s)
implementation for economic growth in 1992 and for both MOL’s and MOE’s
implementation in 1994.
Finally, to address the poverty problems in Mexico, we felt that basic education
and health issues, especially in the rural areas, should be dealt with. However,
because of the government position against borrowing for non-productive
sectors and our ignorance of the sectors in depth, we were stumped. In the end,
our policy dialogue with senior policy makers of the MOE reached an agreement
that the Bank staff would make a sector study to investigate sectoral issues/
problems and propose strategies and priority action programs without the
government’s commitment to borrowing from the Bank.
The MOE policy makers were so impressed by the report’s clear and sharp
analysis that the Vice-Minister invited us to have a one-day seminar at a closed
meeting with the senior officials of the MOE. This report and seminar softened
MOE’s suspicion of Bank’s technical assistance capacity and its position of not
borrowing from the Bank for education sector. In addition, we argued that the
Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOH) collaborated with our human
development sector division for a basic health care loan in early 1990, and the
health care and education services are two important parts of investment in
human development; MOE would also benefit from collaboration with the Bank.
In 1991 and 1992, the Bank and government of Mexico finally launched two
projects to address the priority needs of the poverty groups, which were
identified by the earlier Bank sector studies: primary education in four poor and
underserved states and initial (early childhood) education in ten poor states on
a pilot basis out of a total 32 states. The primary education project aimed to:
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(i) provide educational materials, including books for school libraries and some
bilingual reading books for primary schools mostly in rural areas; (ii) upgrade
skills of underqualified teachers and provide in-service training for qualified
teachers and teacher trainers; (iii) rehabilitate, replace and construct educational
facilities; and (iv) strengthen the institutional capacity for improving the
supervision system, support service delivery system, and the information,
monitoring and evaluation systems, including selected studies to assess the
impact of project activities.
The initial (early childhood) education (IE) project aimed to: (i) develop and
upgrade human resources in the IE subsector; (ii) develop and distribute
instructional materials for IE, and (iii) strengthen management capacity at federal,
state, and community levels. This project supported the Mexican government’s
innovative strategy to redress the inequity in opportunity and quality of primary
education, and the health and nutritional status of children before entering
kindergarten and primary schools by educating and training parents in early
childhood development in the poor, rural and lagging areas. Although this
free-standing project was the first lending operation of its kind in the Bank, and
the official Bank policy paper did not have any formal policy statement on this
level of education, we did not encounter any problems in financing it. Rather,
we were praised at the Board presentation for taking this initiative for poverty
reduction. Also, the government of Belgium joined the WB in financing this
innovative project.
Also in 1992, the Bank agreed to lend for MOL’s implementation of a largescale vocational-technical retraining program and labor mobility improvement
program addressing the massive unemployment of displaced workers during the
debt crisis in the 1980s and labor market mobility and employment services
problems for rapid economic growth recovery.
The next two years were a slack period for our sector operations, partly because
both the Bank and the government wanted to observe how the initial pilot
projects took off for implementation, and partly because the MOE’s enthusiasm
lapsed somewhat. In 1994, however, the Bank and the Mexico government agreed
to launch two more operations: Primary education-II project for MOE and
Technical Education and Training Modernization Project for both MOE’s and
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MOL’s implementation. The revival of Mexico government’s enthusiasm was caused
by several factors. First, our Regional Vice President’s personal meeting with the
president of Mexico contributed to the acceleration of Mexican government’s
borrowing from the Bank for human development investment. Referring to the
East Asian Miracle report just published by the Bank (World Bank, 1993), the
president of Mexico acknowledged that investment in human development is
productive and promised to accelerate borrowing from the Bank for the same
purpose.
Second, the government had a good experience with borrowing from the Bank
for economic growth through investment in CONALEP’s vocational-training
programs. Moreover, in 1992, the government obtained a loan for the Labor
Ministry’s implementation of a large-scale vocational-technical retraining program and labor mobility improvement program. The MOE, which had always
been in a competitive position vis-à-vis the Labor Ministry, became eager to
play an active role for poverty alleviation and economic growth.
Third, both the government and Bank realized that on the basis of repeated
operations for vocational and technical education and training programs of both
MOE and MOL, it was time to institute modernized skills education and training
systems practiced in many advanced and middle income countries around the
world.
The Primary Education Project-II was a follow-on project of the first primary
education project approved in 1991. This second project expanded the geographical scope of the assistance. While the primary education-I was piloted in
four poorest rural states, this second project included 11 additional states that
were covered by the Initial (early childhood) Education Project. This extension
of the scope of the project was due partly to MOE’s enhanced confidence of the
project impact, but also due partly political pressures and demands by other
poorer states.
The Modernization of Technical Education and Training Project approved in
1994 was to: establish a national system of competency standards and skills
testing and certification; select public and private training institutions for
redesigning their training programs into modular courses based on the new
competency standards, providing for teaching materials development, instructor
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retraining, and equipment updating; and stimulate enterprises’ demand for
competency-based training, skill testing and certification.
In advancing these two additional loans, we encountered no resistance from
the Mexican authorities or the Bank. While the primary education was justified
in the Bank education sector policy on the basis of its superior rate of return,
it was justified in Mexico as a compensatory program to meet the basic needs
of poverty groups in rural and marginal urban areas. While the training program
was justified in the Bank mainly as part of equity and anti-poverty program, it
was justified in Mexico as a productive program contributing to the future
economic growth, even though it partly addressed the labor market adjustment
needs of the relatively poor workers.
In addition, a monumental incidence for the Mexico government’s social
development policy took place in the same year. WB representatives from the
Research Department and the human development sector division of Country
Department for Mexico, which was managed by me, were invited to a closed
workshop for discussing future policies and programs of the Ministry of Social
Development (MOSD) in 1993. We suspected that the final outcome of the
workshop would be used in the political platform for the presidential campaign
the following year since the incumbent Minister of Social Development had been
nominated by the ruling party (PRI) as the official presidential candidate. At the
end of the workshop, representatives of the Bank were invited to speak. Since
it was a closed workshop, we spoke quite frankly:
“Our Bank colleagues in the agriculture sector division told us that public
subsidies are rampant in Mexico, and the annual fertilizer subsidy given to
farmers alone was equivalent to about two percent of Mexico’s GDP, but in
fact the main beneficiaries of the subsidy are relatively richer and larger farm
owners. The government may want to streamline the public subsidies, so that
they can give them only to the targeted poorer groups. Saved subsidy funds
in this way could be given to socially underprivileged and underserved people
with a good targeting system. One way of effectively targeting the socially
poor groups with good results on the ground would be to give an upfront cash
subsidy to parents, who do not send their kids to school, on conditions that
they send their kids to primary schools and get their children annual health
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checkups and health education in the nearby health centers. Two years ago,
we were helping the Ministry of Health prepare a basic health project for
possible Bank financing. However, we were not convinced that a network of
health centers to be constructed in poorer villages and rural areas under the
project would be well-utilized since, when we visited some rural areas, the
utilization of the existing health centers was very low mainly because the
potential beneficiaries could not pay the nominal copayment, afford the
transportation costs, and were too poor to use the health centers. Also, our
educators said that parents in rural areas were too poor to send their kids to
school. We wonder why the Mexican government gives public subsidies for
goods like fertilizer, but not for education and health services for poor kids.”

Our comment was followed by absolute silence. We believed that Mexican
officials did not like our idea, or they thought it a non-starter. We thought we
had made a blunder and decided to forget this experience.
Sometime later, however, we received a communication from the Ministry of
Finance that they were interested in the suggestion that we made at the MOSD
workshop and whether the Bank could help them prepare a project for possible
Bank financing. Since we did not program such an activity in our budget, we
instantly started an application for the Japanese trust fund for project preparation. However, we soon had to stop pursuing such activities since we
received news that the presidential candidate was assassinated on a campaign
trail. Years after I left the Bank and repatriated to my home country, I visited
the Bank to find that the Research Department staff member who attended the
MOSD workshop together with us, was working in the human development
sector division of the Latin America Regional Office. She told me that she was
working on the evaluation of the Progresa (later changed to Oportunidades)
project in Mexico, which was a formal name of the project proposal that we
suggested at the MOSD workshop. She told me that the idea was revived after
the assassination of the presidential candidate and minister of Social Development.
The project proposal was financed by the IDB, but the WB was active in
monitoring and evaluating the project implementation and impacts. Eventually,
the conditional cash transfer project (Oportunidades) in Mexico was financed
by the WB in 2009 and 2010 (<Table 2>) and was disseminated to many developing
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<Table 2> Mexico: World Bank human development sector lending portfolio (1991–2017)
(unit: $ million)
Year
Project
approved
ID

Project name

2017

P160309 Higher Ed

2014

P149858

2014

Loan
Year
amount completed
130

Cancelled

150

2018

P147185 School Manage w/ Parent Participation III (APL III)

350

2018

2014

P147212 Social Protection System

350

2021

2013

P147244 Upper Sec Ed Dev Policy Loan III

300

2015

2012

P126297 Upper Sec Ed Dev Policy Loan II

300

2013

2010

P115347 School Manage w/ Parent Participation III (APLII)

220

2011

2010

P112262 Upper Sec Ed Dev Policy Loan I

700

2011

2010

P122349 Additional Fin for Oportunidades (II)

1,250

NA

2010

P101369 Compensatory Ed (Early Childhood Ed + PrimaryED)

100

2014

2010

P116226 Support to Soc Protect (Health Insurance)

1,250

2013

2009

P1150673 Support to Oportunidades Project

1,504

2013

2005

P085593 Tertiary Ed Assistance (APL I) (Loans to Assistance)

180

2011

2005

P088728 Ed Quality Improv-Result based Grants

240

2009

2004

P085851 Basic Ed Dev III (Adaptable Prj Loan III)

300

2007

2002

P057531 Basic Ed Dev II (Adaptable Prj Loan II)

300

2004

2001

P066321 Basic Health III

350

2009

1998

P055061 Health System Reform (TA)

25

2002

1998

P007720 Health System Reform (Adj)

700

2002

1998

P049895 Higher Ed Financing

180

2006

1998

P040199 Basic Ed Dev I (APL I) (CONAFE)

150

2001

1995

P007689 Basic Health II

310

2002

1995

P040462 Essential Social Service Program

500

1998

1994

P034490 Technical Education and Training Modernization

265

2003

1994

P007725 Primary Education

412

1997

1992

P007724 Labor Market and Productivity Enhancement (MOL)

174

1998

1992

P007716 Initial Education-Early Childhood Ed

80

1998

1991

P007690 Primary Ed

250

1997

1991

P007704 Technical Training Project (MOE/CONALEP)

152

1998

1990

P007655 Basic Health Care

180

1996

Reduce Inequality in Ed Opportunity (Early
Childhood Ed)

Source: The World Bank website (www.worldbank.org).
Note: APL, Applied Program Loan; MOE, Ministry of Education; NA, not applicable.
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countries all over the world, and the Bank research department published an
impact evaluation report of many conditional cash transfer projects (World
Bank, 2009).
Late in 1994, our department encountered an extraordinary opportunity to
play an active role for poverty alleviation in Mexico. The financial crisis that hit
Mexico in 1994 forced the government to take a severe retrenchment policy
again, just as it was forced to take such a policy as part of the structural
adjustment program for getting out of the debt crisis in the late 1980s. In that
year, the human development sector of the department in the Bank had already
offered loans to the Mexican government for the primary education project-II
and technical education and training modernization project, and had just
appraised a basic health project-II for a future loan. Through these activities,
we learned from our Mexican counterparts that the government was preparing
the next year’s budget, but that it would be much smaller than the previous
year’s; most of the cuts would be in the human development sector covering
education, health, nutrition, and vocational-technical training, just as had occurred
during the late 1980s. In particular, primary education and basic health in the
underprivileged and vulnerable areas would suffer the most cuts. Therefore, the
Bank discussed with the Mexican government about ways to protect these
poorer and vulnerable groups of the population from retrenchment and agreed
that Bank financial assistance would save essential social service programs for
those groups in the next two to three years that would cost about $1 billion.
Later, this total program cost was shared with the Inter-American Development
Bank, who showed interest in joint financing. The human development sector
played a key role in appraising the essential social service programs and
presenting the proposal to the Board for approval in a short period of time. It
was the first time such a social sector budget support or adjustment type loan
was extended in the Bank.
A few years later, in 1998, the primary education project was followed by the
first of a series of three large loans to support a slice of the Mexican government’s
long-term compensatory basic education development program for underserved
poorer rural and marginal urban areas (later in 2002 and 2004). We also noted
later that the IE project was followed by a compensatory education project to
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strengthen IE and primary education at the community level in underserved
states (2010). Stimulated by the Bank-instigated sector study and Bank-financed
pilot primary education and IE projects, the Mexican government prepared its
own long-term basic education development program, which became a sound
and easy basis for a series of Bank’s applied program loans (APLs). While the
primary education projects covered 15 states selected on the basis of poverty
indicators, the basic education APLs covered selected poor and underserved
municipalities of all states. We were so happy to enjoy the results of good
partnership.
Another initiative taken by our human development sector was supporting a
higher education financing project in 1998. The education sector in Latin
America was then well known for its serious inequity in financing higher
education. The tuition and fees for public higher education were so low and
nominal that the system in fact provided public subsidies to students from the
relatively well-to-do families, who accounted for a large part of the student
body. Young persons from relatively poorer families could not afford higher
education since they had to work on a full-time basis to earn their living, and
scholarships or student loans were virtually non-existent.
At this time, the education sector managers in the Bank were hotly debating
a draft policy paper on the education sector including higher education. The
draft proposal put higher education at lower priority than primary and
secondary education, and Bank financing for higher education were to be
restricted unless scholarship and/or student loan systems were developed or a
reasonable user-fees system practiced. Opposing managers mostly working for
countries in Africa and Middle East regions argued that their client countries
had a keen shortage of young leaders in public and private sectors and a cadre
of competent civil servants who needed to be trained by higher education
institutions in a relatively short time. Proponent policy makers argued that
higher educational institutions in those countries had wasted scarce public
resources at the expense of basic and secondary education, which should have
enjoyed a higher priority for public investment.
Our department took the position that the Bank should not be just passively
closing the door with prerequisites against extending higher education loans; it
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should be taking a more proactive position for investment in higher education
by helping the countries establish and strengthen scholarship and student-loan
systems. Therefore, in 1998, we helped the government of Mexico establish a
student-loan system for private universities that practiced a realistic user-fee
system, and strengthen a fledgling student-loan system in one relatively richer
state, Sonora. A decade later, this initiative was followed by the government,
which transformed the student-loan system to a public assistance system with
Bank-financing.

2) Application of the mandates in Central America
Our education sector effort to operate as a frontrunner in carrying out the
Bank poverty alleviation mandate in the 1990s culminated in El Salvador. In the
late 1980s, the El Salvador government finally reached a peace agreement with
belligerent farmers or revolutionary groups after more than a decade of civil
war, and asked for Bank financing of the Community Education (EDUCO)
Program for basic education.
During the civil war, the government’s education services did not reach rural
areas. Therefore, parents in innovative rural communities launched self-help
movements to provide school facilities by converting community halls and
adding more structures, and organized basic school-management committees,
which contracted teachers among community residents and outsiders, monitored
and supervised teachers’ attendances and performances, rehabilitated and
maintained school facilities, and financed other school expenses. When the civil
war ceased, the MOE tried to provide traditional basic education services as in
urban and marginal areas. However, many rural communities wanted to maintain
their parent-centered school-management committees. The MOE decided that
maintaining the school-management committees organized by parents and
integrating them as an official extension of the MOE administrative network
would be more efficient and effective in constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining school facilities, monitoring teachers’ attendances and performances,
distributing textbooks and other instructional materials, and even channeling
school administration expenses, including teachers’ salaries. It also tested
students’ attendance and learning achievements at the community schools and
found that they were equal or better than the government-managed schools in
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other areas not affected by the war. The Bank also quickly assessed students’
attendance and learning achievements, using the USAID test data on math and
language subjects and confirmed the MOE’s earlier findings. Therefore, the Bank
financed the community basic education (EDUCO) program, rehabilitating school
facilities, training teachers, incorporating teachers into the government compensation and pension systems, distributing instructional materials, and supervising and evaluating teachers’ performances, all through the EDUCO committees.
This program attracted the interest of many governments both in Latin America
and other continents that had problems administering and improving rural basic
education programs and systems.
The project was successfully implemented and positively affected the MOE’s
planning and evaluation program, instruction materials production and distribution system, teachers’ supervision and evaluation system, and many other
aspects. When James Wolfensohn was elected as the new president of the WB
in 1995, he set up a Presidential Award for Excellence in the Results on the
Ground to encourage project implementation, outcomes and impacts. The
EDUCO project was selected for the second year of the Excellence Award. The
Development Economics Department, a research arm of the Bank, took up an
in-depth and scientific research of the project design and outcome for wide
dissemination outside of the Bank (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999).
Other countries in Central America also applied for Bank loans to attack poverty
in rural areas by expanding and improving basic education. However, our
technical department advisers commented that we should not advance such
loans since they would likely use the funds as fungible resources. In other words,
the governments would be diverting a budget amount equivalent to the Bank
loan for basic education to other purposes, and therefore, there would be no
additional resources available for basic education. That practice is why those
countries did not expand and improve basic education in the past. Moreover,
one specific country had a clause in its constitution stipulating that a certain
percentage of the MOE annual budget must be allocated to higher education,
which is used by higher educational institutions autonomously. Therefore, the
advisers argued, besides the fungible use of Bank loan for basic education, the
loan would increase higher education budgets in proportion to the Bank loan
for basic education, worsening the inequity of higher education financing.
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To prevent this outcome, we decided to ask for a policy statement on a government’s strategy for expanding the future basic education budget; the Bank
and government would jointly review approved annual budgets for basic education,
even though the Bank loan was not a policy-based sector loan. During the project
implementation period, we did not observe any loan fungibilty problem.
Ever since the Bank adopted poverty reduction and economic growth recovery
with institutionalization as its overriding objectives and strategies for lending
operations, the average annual education sector lending amount almost doubled
throughout the 1990s, irrespective of the change of WB presidents, and the
education sector lending as percent of total Bank lending of all sectors also
<Table 3> Scale of WB and education sector lending: 1963–2020
ALL
ALL
ED
ED as % of
sectors
sectors per year
all sectors
year

Year

ED
sector

1963–68

162

6,744

27

1,124

2.4

Woods

1969–73

723

12,849

145

2,570

5.6

McNamara-1

1974–78 1,339

32,320

268

2,570

4.1

McNamara-2

1979–81 1,671

33,784

557

11,261

4.9

McNamara-3

1982–86 3,525
1987–89 2,195

73,717
58,262

705
732

14,743
19,421

4.8
3.8

Clausen
Conable

1990–91 3,738

43,387

1,869

21,694

8.6

Conable

1992–95 8,144

88,760

2,036

22,190

9.2

Preston

1996–00 8,609 115,467 1,722

23,093

7.5

Wolfensohn-1

2001–05
2006
2007–11
2012–16
2017–20

9,534
23,641
39,611
51,665
48,150

8.7
8.4
7.1
7.0
8.4

Wolfensohn-2
Wolfowitz
Zoellick
Kim
Malpass

8,513
1,990
14,072
18,002
16,182

97,669
23,641
198,056
258,326
192,600

1,703
1,990
2,814
3,600
4,046

President

(unit: $ million)
Lending goal
Economic
growth
Poverty
reduction
Poverty
reduction
Poverty
reduction
Debt resolution
Debt resolution
Poverty
reduction
Poverty
reduction
Poverty
reduction
MDG
MDG
MDG
MDG
SDG

Source: WB Annual Report to Board of Governors.
Note: ED, Education Sector; ALL, All sectors; WB, World Bank; MDGs, Millennium
Development Goals; SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals.
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doubled in the 1990s (Table 3). The human development sector was no longer
an outsider or a marginal player of the Bank lending operations, but had become
a main actor.

Ⅲ. FROM EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE - SINCE 2000
1. During the 2000s: MDGs
Since I left the Bank in late 1998, I have taught at a graduate school in Seoul,
Korea, my home country. I was extremely pleased with the news that all aid
donors and recipients got together at the UN in 2000 and declared that poverty
reduction was the common goal to be pursued by 2015. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the main guideline for the concerted efforts. I
thought that for the first time in aid history, poverty reduction became the main
goal and objective in consecutive two decades. In the 1950s, all bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies provided assistance for economic rehabilitation and
growth recovery of mainly European countries and Japan, and in the 1960s for
economic growth of developing countries. In the 1970s, the Bank waged a war
against poverty in developing countries, but it could not continue due to the
global debt crisis in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the Bank renewed its effort for
poverty reduction, and in the new millennium years, the WB sought to carry out
this same mandate continuously. Moreover, in the 2000s, all international aid
agencies agreed to work for the common goal, and the WB took up the role of
monitoring and reporting the progress of the concerted efforts for poverty
reduction.

2. Education Sector Aid for Economic Value
Looking at the WB education sector operations from outside of the Bank,
together with other colleagues sharing the same concerns, was refreshing.
Although the WB was officially linked to the UN system, we rarely worked in
collaboration with or in consideration of other UN agencies in the past.
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Therefore, when we observed Bank operations from the external perspective, we
tended to compare the operations of the WB vis-a-vis other bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies, especially UN agencies. The most striking characteristic of the WB was that it worked like a private bank governed by shareholders,
extending mainly loans/credits for the economic growth of aid recipients;
meanwhile, UN agencies provided mainly grants for humanitarian assistance and
operated democratically like the USA Senate, with each state holding equal
voting power.
As a result, the Bank education sector policies and reports seemed to justify
its education sector operations by economic criteria, most often by rates of
return of educational investments, while UN agencies justified their education
sector operations by non-economic, legal criteria like human rights. One 2014
WB report entitled Comparable Estimates of Returns to Schooling Around the

World exemplifies how education is seen in terms of economic growth by
empirically demonstrating that one extra year of schooling boosts earnings by
10 percent on average (Montenegro & Patrinos, 2014). Together with the Bank,
OECD and USAID seemed to focus on the economic value of education. In the
2009 publication of Education at a Glance, an OECD annual report, education
is clearly linked to income, thus arguing for the importance of investing in
human capital (OECD, 2009). The report asserts that people with advanced
degrees earn an average of $186,000 dollars more during their lives than those
without degrees. The education strategy of USAID likewise was based on the
human capital development (quantitative and qualitative) perspective and the
critical association between human capital development and economic growth.

3. Education Sector Aid for Promotion of Human Capability and
Human Rights
UN agencies like UNICEF and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
have made clear what they aim to achieve through education sector aid. For
instance, UNICEF’s Strategic Plan (2018–2021) suggests that the organization
intends to support the most vulnerable children worldwide to: thrive in their
communities, enjoy freedom to choose, have an equitable chance in life, and

국제개발협력│89

receive inclusive quality education and learning opportunities (UNICEF, 2017).
UNDP is an actor in the aid community whose works combine the capability
framework as well as the human rights-based perspective. Both UNICEF and
UNDP assert education provides individuals with capabilities that enable them
to challenge the status quo and bring about a better life and prosperity (Alkire,
2005; Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Unterhalter, 2003). In 2000, the UNDP
helped encourage other aid actors to embrace this framework through its
influential publication, Human Rights and Human Development (2000). Many
national governments and international donors in the field began to implement
strategies in accord with the UNDP’s advice and recommendations. Moreover,
UNICEF and UNESCO declared their commitment to support for rights-based
development programming through networks of nonprofit organizations (NPOs),
such as Save the Children and Oxfam (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000).
Outsiders like us wondered why two groups of international donors to the
education sector of developing countries argue differently, and which group’s
argument is right. We thought that it had to be judged by their aid effectiveness
or outcome on the ground. Our literature review showed that the economic
value approach to the education sector investment did result in higher wage and
earnings, and thereby economic growth and better income distribution (Asiedu,
2014; Colclough et al., 2010; Lee, 1981; Mincer, 1974; Psacharopoulos, 1985,
1994; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004; Tilak, 1989).
In addition, the non-economic value, capability and human rights approach to
the education sector investment also had supporting literature. It shows that
impacts of investment in education go beyond the enhancement of cognitive
knowledge and skills: improvement of hygienic and sanitary practices of children
of educational service recipients, decline in their childbirth rates, and increased
savings in the next generation, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and
prosperity. However, only scant research results were found on the improvement
of life skills such as participation in community programs and political activities,
promotion of social cohesion, respect for human rights, etc. (Heyneman, 2003;
Heyneman & Lee, 2016).
As such, we got the impression that the capabilities and human rights approach
was a more normative argument, although it gave a broader insight. In contrast,
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the economic value approach to the education sector investment gave us a more
positive impression with quantitative and concrete measure of economic value
or returns to the investment in human resources. However, it also gave us a
narrow view of the investment outcomes.

4. A Hybrid Approach
We thought the two approaches might be blended to make up for the weaknesses of each approach. What would be the practical differences between the
one-sided argument and a blended approach? We could not imagine any
specific advantage of one approach over the other. First, when we review our
experience with the WB, we did not make a cost-benefit or rate-of-return
analysis to justify basic education or IE projects, which aimed to alleviate
poverty and provide inclusive quality education in underprivileged rural areas.
We simply showed the inequitable public provision of basic education service,
which is one of the essential and basic needs of the poverty groups and which
would contribute to expanded capabilities throughout their lives. It did not
matter whether the recipients of basic education service thought or claimed the
service as human rights. They simply appreciated it for satisfying one of their
basic needs. At the same time, research literature amply demonstrates the value
of the economic value approach, since it would ensure that project outcomes
would be evaluated more rigorously upon implementation.
Second, the capability or human rights approach did not discriminate among
levels of education. All levels of education, including adult and female education
in an informal or community environment, were recognized as human rights and
were assumed to equally expand human capabilities and enrich human life. This
approach was advantageous for education aid to select different levels of
education, depending on diverse situations in developing countries.
However, the economic value approach discriminated education services by
level. Over the last several decades, researchers have found evidence of different
rates of return for different levels of education. Namely, in developing countries,
the returns on education aid were found to be greatest at the primary education level and lower at higher levels of schooling (Psacharopoulos, 1985). This
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finding has largely affected the inception of many global initiatives for basic
education, which changed the architecture of educational assistance (NiñoZarazúa, 2016), although this assertion has been challenged by other scholars
(Bennell, 1996; Knight et al., 1992; Montenegro & Patrinos, 2014). The achievement
of universal primary education was one of eight MDGs set out by the
international aid community in 2000, in line with the 1990 and 2000 World
Conference on Education for All (Birchler & Michaelowa, 2016). However, the
WB also emphasized vocational-technical secondary and post-secondary education
and engineering higher education, when its mandate was economic growth
during the 1960s. The Bank emphasized basic education and non-formal adult
education in its lending operations, when its mandate was poverty alleviation
during the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s (Psacharopoulos, 2006; Table 3). Thus, both
approaches were equipped to meet the needs of various situations at different
times flexibly.
The differences between the two approaches to international aid for education
were that the economic approach only focused on the quantifiable, pecuniary,
and narrow concepts of educational benefits, while the capability and human
rights approach emphasized the broad, non-quantifiable and non-pecuniary
concepts of educational benefits. Moreover, the non-economic value approach
to educational aid had the disadvantage of weaker evaluations of aid impacts,
while the economic approach had more rigorous evaluations of aid impacts,
though the impacts were of limited scope. Therefore, the two approaches could
be combined or blended.
Each of the two approaches could make up for the disadvantages of other
approach. In particular this blended approach would help us meet the SDGs
through 2030: The SDGs contain not only poverty alleviation and environmental
goals as in MDGs, but also economic growth and equity goals. We concluded
that the two approaches together, rather than separately, could meet the
challenges of achieving the SDGs better than a single approach alone.
We were, therefore, very pleased to learn of the launch of the Education for
All ― Fast Track Initiative (FTI) led by the WB, with the developing countries’
renewed goal to achieve equitable and quality education for all in 2002. The FTI
evolved into the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2016 (Menashy &

92│국제개발협력

Dryden-Peterson, 2015; World Bank, 2016). The goals of the GPE offered good
evidence of convergence of the two approaches to international aid for basic
education.
Historically, the WB has viewed human rights through a strictly political prism,
but the title of its publication, “Incorporating Human Rights into Development,”
was straightforward enough to show the conceptual blending of the two
approaches. In the report the analytical perspectives of the funders are largely
grounded in the human rights-based dimension, though they maintain their
focus on economic contributions as well (OECD & World Bank, 2013). After all,
about 121 million children ages 6-15 were still out of primary and lower
secondary school in 2019. Including 138 million youth of upper secondary
school age, a total of 258 million children, adolescents and youth are out of
school. The challenge is most acute in sub-Saharan Africa, where the net
enrolment rate of primary school stood at only 79 per cent in 2018. This means
more than 20 percent of primary school age group children are out of school
(UNESCO, 2019). In practice, the Bank financing of basic education was justified
not by the economic value criterion, but by the basic needs criterion, while the
UN system declared basic education a human right mainly because it satisfies
the basic needs. Both approaches have sufficient common grounds to join their
efforts.
The GPE is a multi-stakeholder partnership and funding platform that aims to
strengthen education systems in developing countries in order to dramatically
increase the number of children who are in school and learning. It claims that
since 2002, there are 77 million more children in school in GPE partner
countries and US$5.3 billion in grants have been allocated to about 70 partner
developing country governments. GPE also encourages partner developing
countries to allocate 20% of their national budget to education, with a
significant proportion (45%) distributed for primary education (GPE, 2019).

Ⅳ. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WORLD BANK
We can take out some lessons from our internal and external experiences with
the WB education sector lending operations. First, the lending operations of the
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education sector in the Bank were guided principally by the Bank-wide
mandates and country-assistance strategies. The education sector policy was
subject to these Bank-wide mandates and country development strategy, and
could not replace or override them. The education sector policy was formulated
mainly on the basis of the philosophies and intrinsic values inherent in the
sector, taking into account mainly economic growth of a country and relatively
neglecting the poverty alleviation mandate. Basic education projects including
early childhood and primary education were not justified by its cost-benefit or
rate of return. No such project appraisal reports included any economic analysis.
They were justified mainly by their contributions to poverty alleviation mandates
and by their satisfying basic needs of the poorer groups in the short and
medium terms. Through repeated investment, basic education would contribute
to economic growth in the long run.
Second, the Bank should be careful not to impose a ready-made Bank
education sector policy to borrowing countries. We had a bitter experience with
the diversified or comprehensive secondary education projects in the 1970s and
1980s. A broad set of education policies may be recommended to member
countries with different emphasis and pace in divergent countries and regions.
The Bank should not sit back after declaring its restrictive education sector
policies with preconditions or prerequisites. As a development bank, it should
be more proactive in helping the member countries to overcome their constraints with financing and technical assistance, as observed in higher education
financing project in Mexico. However, those projects with home-grown programs
and designs, like the EDUCO project in El Salvador and the compensatory basic
education development program in Mexico, had greater possibilities for successful
implementation and sustained impacts.
Third, with the increase in Bank financing of basic education projects, a lot
of in-service teacher training programs were financed. It was regarded as a
typical investment in human capital, and, therefore, did not require much
analytical justification in the Bank. Our technical department advisers did not
comment on the teacher training components of the basic education projects,
either.
However, proliferation of in-service teacher training program made us un-
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comfortable about the outcome. When we sought technical department advice
on the empirical research results outside the Bank in advanced countries, we did
not get any reference to reliable empirical evidence. However, on the one hand,
we knew that an in-depth study of the basic education in the northeastern states
of Brazil showed no significant contribution of in-service teacher training to
students’ academic achievement (Harbison & Hanushek, 1992). On the other
hand, many years later, one scientific empirical study made in connection with
the Korean government’s aid program for Laos showed positive effects of a
teacher in-service training program on students’ academic achievements. Several
groups of professors of the only medical school in Laos received one-year
fellowships offered by the Korean government and underwent on-the-job inservice training at the Seoul National University Hospital in Korea. After they
returned to Laos, they taught the same courses as before. Then, the difference
in academic achievements between their students (the experimental group) and
other students taught by non-fellowship professors (the control group) was
greater than the difference before the fellowship training project between the
same courses (Lee & Kim, 2015). We hope that the Technical Departments
(former Central Projects Vice-Presidency) and Independent Evaluation Department
of the Bank could take up a rigorous evaluation of in-service teacher training
programs, so that the Bank can continue financing them based on scientific
evidence.
Fourth, likewise, the Bank should strengthen evaluation studies more flexibly.
The Board of Directors said social sectors should also try to conduct economic
analysis or cost-benefit analysis as much as possible. In practice, however, it is
difficult to apply such analytical techniques during project appraisals. If we tried
to apply such analysis, the project processing would be delayed unreasonably or
misuse/abuse the analysis without proper framework for the proposed project.
In Bank member countries, especially in lower-income countries, necessary
time-series data for analysis were unavailable. For example, for rates of return
analysis for vocational-technical education and training projects, ideally it is
essential to have baseline and future life-time earnings profiles by industry/
occupation, age, education level (vocational/technical secondary graduates separately from general secondary graduates), and years of working experience on
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a regional or national level. However, such earnings profiles are not available
even in many advanced countries, let alone developing ones. Therefore, we have
to make drastic assumptions to the extent of defying the purpose of the analysis.
Nevertheless, we can build up data through proposed projects to be financed
by the WB. The Bank should try to include collection of baseline data on a
reasonable scale, such as tracer studies and other labor market studies in the
proposed project, especially when the Bank finances similar projects in series;
they could be used to justify follow-up projects. Nowadays, the Bank finances
not only brick-and-mortar projects, but also software/institution-building components without strong scientific evidence (curriculum reform, textbook development, supervision system reform, distance teacher training, etc.). The WB can
function as a knowledge bank and provide persuasive advice to our member
countries only when it has sector policies based on scientific evidence tailored
to each country or region.
Fifth, a sound education sector analysis can serve as a good basis for the
borrowing government and the Bank to identify possible project proposals
jointly for future Bank financing. The borrower would have a sense of ownership
of the project.
Sixth, the Bank had a unique mechanism for lending operation quality control.
On the basis of operation-related research activities and rigorous monitoring
and dissemination of academic research conducted outside of the Bank, the
technical department (or the old Central Project Vice-Presidency) provided
useful advice and comments on the lending operations of the human development
sector divisions of Regional Offices. Most of the time, Regional sector divisions
found the comments useful and constructive. Sometimes outside NGOs provided
harsh criticism, but very often their comments were based on unfamiliarity with
the membership-based international organizations and characteristics of largescale development banks. The collegial comments/advice inside the Bank were
more insightful and provided democratic checks. This operational quality
control mechanism should be reinforced and encouraged in the future.
Finally, when we observe the evolution from the FTI to the GPE, we cannot
get rid of our concern that we had with WB’s integrated agricultural or rural/
regional development projects during McNamara’s era. In our opinion, the pitfall
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of the projects was not in the integrated and coordinated “planning and strategy,”
but in the integrated and coordinated “execution.” The GPE was conceived as
multi-stakeholder “partnership and funding platform.” We hope that the GPE
would not develop beyond its originally conceived boundary. It should remain as
a faithful Partnership and Fund, and the Execution would be better done by
partners individually.
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